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Abstract 
This paper investigates aggregate bankruptcies in Japan, with a particular focus on revealing the 
dynamic characteristics of the series. For this purpose, we estimate a vector autoregression 
comprised of five economic variables and the bankruptcy rate, and construct its impulse 
responses. The estimation results show expected and consistent relationships between economic 
shocks and aggregate bankruptcies: in particular, a positive shock in the call rate clearly raises 
the bankruptcy rate. Our results further imply that changes in the bankruptcy rate reflect the 
accumulated impact of various shocks in the present and past, to which it has a distinct response 
structure. 
JEL classification: C32, E32, G33 
Keywords: bankruptcy, bankruptcy rate, vector autoregression, impulse response, Japan 
                                                
* Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the 2008 Spring Meeting of the Japanese Economic 
Association, the Gifu Conference, the Yamaguchi Conference, and the 51st (2007) Annual Meeting of the 
International Society for the System Sciences. We would like to thank the participants for helpful 
comments and suggestions. We especially thank Kazumi Asako, Tsutomu Miyagawa, Hideaki Murase, 
Kazuo Ogawa, Masaya Sakuragawa and Tomoyoshi Yabu for insightful discussions. This research was 
supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (17730200, 18103001 and 20730176). Any 
views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the organizations with which 
they are affiliated. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
The number of bankruptcies fluctuates greatly over time. In the case of Japan, the number has 
varied from about 6,500 to 21,000 per year since 1975 (Figure 1). Intuitively, the fluctuations 
have often been associated with economic conditions. Economic essays, debates and newspaper 
articles that are based on such an association, a priori, are quite common. However, the actual 
structure of the relationship between aggregate bankruptcies and economic conditions is still 
unclear and ambiguous (Economic Planning Agency, 2000, Ch. 1). 
In the international academic literature, since Altman’s (1968) famous work applying 
discriminant analysis, bankruptcy studies based on micro data have been numerous (e.g., 
Ohlson, 1980; Shumway, 2001; Hillegeist et al., 2004; and Hwang et al., 2007). They basically 
sought to find relationships between financial indicators of individual firms and the probability 
of bankruptcy. In other words, they attempted to predict bankruptcies based on the financial 
condition of the firm, such as their costs, profit, debt, assets, and/or market value. In a study of 
Japanese firms, Shirata (2003) proposed a bankruptcy prediction model comprising four 
financial indicators of each firm using discriminant analysis of medium- and large-sized 
enterprises. The Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2002, Ch. 3) estimated probit models of 
the probability of bankruptcy of small- and medium-sized enterprises in which the probability 
was explained by the firm’s and manager’s characteristics in addition to five financial indicators 
of the firm. Fukuda et al. (2008) estimated probit models for medium-sized enterprises that 
explained the borrower’s probability of bankruptcy by four financial indicators of the firm and 
measures of bank health. 
Studies have also emerged on the macro aspects of bankruptcies. This is partly because 
the aggregate bankruptcy rate can be considered a prevalent indicator of the amount of credit 
risk of the economy (Koopman and Lucas, 2005). Altman (1983) estimated a distributed lag 
model for the US in which changes in the business failure rate are explained by the growth rates 
of real GNP, the S&P Stock Index, the money supply (M2), and new firm formation. The results 
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found that the first three factors negatively affect the business failure rate, and the last factor 
positively affects it. Since this study, a number of analyses on the rate of corporate bankruptcies, 
failures and liquidations have been published. First, researchers have estimated distributed lag 
models or simple multiple regression models (Wadhwani, 1986; Hudson 1986; Turner et al., 
1992; Platt and Platt, 1994; Young, 1995; Vlieghe, 2001; and Dewaelheyns and Hulle, 2008). In 
general, they have used the current and/or lagged interest rate, price level, aggregate output, 
wage rate, new firm formation rate, and profits and banking conditions of the corporate sector as 
explanatory factors. 
Second, sophisticated variations of time series techniques have been applied to the rate 
of bankruptcy, failure and liquidation (Liu, 2004; Liu and Pang, 2005; Fabling and Grimes, 
2005; Gaffeo and Santoro, 2006; Drehmann et al., 2006; Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle, 2007). 
These studies estimated economic systems using vector autoregression or error-correction 
models, and investigated the relationships and behaviors of key variables in the estimated 
system. Similar to the first approach, these studies have used the interest rate, price level, 
aggregate output, new firm formation rate, and/or profits and banking conditions of the 
corporate sector as main variables in the estimated economic system coupled with the 
bankruptcy/failure/liquidation rate. 
However, for Japan’s economy, there are only a few studies on the macro aspects of 
bankruptcies. Ohta (1996) and the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (2002, Ch. 3) 
estimated multiple regression models. The former, based on annual data from 1968 to 1993, 
examined various combinations of economic variables linked to macroeconomic fluctuations, 
conditions in financial markets and the corporate sector to explain the bankruptcy rate, partly by 
industry and partly by firm size. The latter, based on quarterly data from 1981 to 2001, used the 
ordinary profit rate, liquidity in the corporate sector, the real land price, and the real call rate as 
cardinal factors to explain the logarithm of the number of bankruptcies. The Economic Planning 
Agency (2000, Ch. 1), using quarterly data from 1977 to 2000, estimated a distributed lag model 
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of the bankruptcy rate of the small- and medium-sized enterprise sector, explained by retained 
earnings in the sector, interest rate on short-term loans, the real land price, and an institutional 
dummy. They found significant relationships between these factors and aggregate bankruptcies; 
however, the characteristics of aggregate bankruptcies are not well known because of the lack of 
ample empirical evidence. 
This paper attempts to enhance understanding of the macro aspects of bankruptcies in 
Japan. That is, we formally investigate the aggregate bankruptcy rate, with a particular focus on 
examining the dynamic features of the series. For this purpose, we estimate a vector 
autoregression comprising economic variables and the bankruptcy rate, and construct its 
impulse responses. This method belongs to the second approach mentioned above, and to the 
authors’ knowledge, this approach has not been previously used for Japan’s economy. We apply 
a standard framework to the model and construction of impulse responses to provide a clear 
foundation for further studies, and to enable us to compare the results with those of numerous 
studies of the Japanese economy using vector autoregressions (see the next section). We use five 
economic variables in the model: the policy interest rate, price level, output of the economy, and 
profit and liquidity of the corporate sector. In summary, this paper has two contributions. First, it 
contributes as a new study on aggregate bankruptcy in Japan. Second, it contributes as a 
straightforward extension of vector autoregression analyses of the Japanese economy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
methodology and variables to be analyzed. Section 3 estimates the model and constructs 
impulse responses. Section 4 extends the model through an industry-level analysis and 
constructs impulse responses for the manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail trade 
sectors. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
***** Figure 1 ***** 
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2. Methodology and Variables 
The vector autoregression has been popular in economic analysis since the seminal work of 
Sims (1980). The most standard (reduced-form) expression of the vector autoregression is 
written as: 
ttt uxLx +Γ= −1)( , 
where xt is an )1( ×n  vector of time series variables, )(LΓ  is a polynomial matrix in the q-th 
order lag operator, and ut is an )1( ×n  vector of nonautocorrelated disturbances. All 
components of the matrix )(LΓ  can be estimated by ordinary least squares equation-by-
equation with consistency (Sims et al., 1990). 
Based on the estimated parameters, we can construct impulse response functions, 
which are defined as the response of an element of xt at time t + s (s = 0, 1, 2,…) to a one-time 
shock in the element of xt at time t. Plotting impulse responses is a practical way to visually 
show and examine dynamic behaviors of time series variables in response to the various shocks. 
Here, we suppose the disturbances are rewritten as the combination of fundamental shocks by 
A0ut = et, where et is a vector of fundamental (uncorrelated) shocks, and A0 is an )( nn×  
invertible matrix. A standard way to identify the system and extract the effects of fundamental 
shocks is to impose a recursive structure on the matrix A0; that is, to assume A0 as a lower 
triangular matrix with unit diagonal elements. This paper follows this Cholesky decomposition 
approach, though it requires us to define the ordering of variables. 
The core advantage of the vector autoregression is that all variables are (potentially) 
treated as endogenous variables, and the relationships between them are unrestricted before 
estimation. Sims (1980) proposed the model as a potent alternative to large-scale 
macroeconomic models, and since then it has been a key methodology in macroeconomic 
analysis. Furthermore, the framework has evolved in diverse directions (e.g., Litterman, 1986; 
Blanchard and Quah, 1989; Bernanke et al., 2005; and Uhlig, 2005). For Japan’s economy, there 
are a lot of studies that applied these original or modified vector autoregressions (e.g., Shioji, 
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2000; Miyao, 2000 and 2002; Hosono et al., 2001; Ogawa, 2000 and 2002; Ford et al., 2003; 
Braun and Shioji, 2004; Fujiwara, 2006; Nakashima, 2006; Shibamoto, 2007; and Inoue and 
Okimoto, 2008: see also a survey by Teruyama (2001) for earlier studies). An important 
objective of these studies has been to identify the effects of monetary policy shocks 
(representatively expressed by shocks in the call rate) on the macroeconomy. This paper partly 
pursues this objective. There is no consensus on which methodology is fundamentally superior, 
and this paper focuses on the standard methodology above.1 
For estimation of the model, we use three macroeconomic variables, two financial 
variables of the corporate sector, and the bankruptcy rate, all of which are quarterly data from 
the first quarter of 1975 to the first quarter of 2005 (121 quarters in total). First, the bankruptcy 
rate is defined as [the number of bankruptcies of corporations in the period]/[the number of 
corporations at the end of the previous period] × 100 (percent). Because the number of 
corporations varied (increased) in Japan, we evaluate the number of bankruptcies in comparison 
with the total number of corporations. The data on the number of corporations are obtained from 
the National Tax Agency Annual Statistics Reports, which is published by the National Tax 
Agency.2 
As a measure of the number of bankruptcies, this paper uses data from the Bankruptcy 
Reports published by Teikoku Databank, Ltd., which is a well-known bankruptcy survey in 
Japan. Teikoku Databank defines “bankruptcy” as a company in any one of the following six 
situations: (1) Drawing unpaid notes twice and transactions with banks are suspended; (2) 
Dissolution of the company (when the representative admits being bankrupt); (3) Applying for 
                                                
1 Furthermore, Engle and Granger (1987) and other scholars have proposed the error-correction model as 
another possible specification of the macroeconomy. However, for Japan’s economy, most studies have 
applied vector autoregressions (an exception is Jang and Ogaki, 2003), and thus this paper also uses the 
vector autoregression methodology. 
2 Because the National Tax Agency only provides annual data, we linearly interpolate these data for the 
quarterly analysis. 
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the application of the Corporate Rehabilitation Law to the court; (4) Applying for the 
commencement of the procedure based on the Civil Rehabilitation Law to the court (since April 
2000, the enforcement date of the law); (5) Applying for liquidation to the court; (6) Applying 
for the commencement of special liquidation to the court. 3  The survey covers bankrupt 
companies with liabilities of 10 million yen or more.4 Furthermore, we exclude individual 
proprietorships from the data set, mainly because we use the results of the survey of 
corporations as outlined below.5 We seasonally adjusted the number of bankruptcies variable 
using the Census X12 procedure. Figure 2 shows the bankruptcy rate. 6  It indicates the 
bankruptcy rate rapidly fell from 1987 to 1990 during the “bubble economy” period, increased 
in the following year, and remains relatively stable.  
 
***** Figure 2 ***** 
 
The macroeconomic variables we use to represent the general economic environment 
are real GDP as the level of output, the GDP deflator as the price level, and the call rate. For real 
GDP and the GDP deflator, we use the official seasonally adjusted series of the 93SNA (fixed-
based, base year = 1995). From 1975 to 1979, we link the old-version official seasonally 
adjusted series of the 68SNA (base year = 1990) based on the quarterly growth rate, because of 
                                                
3 Moreover, “bankruptcy” based on the Composition Law (which was abrogated on March 2000) and 
based on a specific procedure (Kaisha Seiri) provided by the Commercial Law (which was abrogated on 
May 2006) was covered in the survey. Our long-term data set includes both of these cases.  
4 From May 2005, the Bankruptcy Reports begin to cover only the cases corresponding from (3) to (6), 
which are classified as “legal” liquidation. We decided to limit our analysis up to the first quarter of 2005 
because of the discontinuity. 
5 Individual proprietorships account for about 22% of the total number of bankruptcies on average in the 
sample period. They are included in Figure 1. 
6 The shadows in Figures 2, 3 and 5 indicate recession periods, which are officially published by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Office. 
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the lack of the data in the 93SNA for the period. For the call rate, we use the collateralized 
overnight rate (percent per annum) as a proxy of the policy interest rate, which is obtained from 
the Bank of Japan’s official statistics for the entire estimation period.7 To our knowledge, the 
vector autoregression comprising aggregate output, price level, and policy interest rate is a core 
choice for standard modeling (see the literature mentioned above). This paper follows this 
approach.8,9  
To represent business conditions in the corporate sector, we use two financial variables 
in the model: the ordinary profit rate and the quick assets ratio. Both are constructed from the 
results of the Financial Statements Statistics of Corporations by Industry, Quarterly (hereafter, 
FSSC), published by the Ministry of Finance. It surveys quarterly financial statements of 
nonfinancial corporations and publishes the aggregate results. It is an authorized and official 
series of statistics on the corporate sector in Japan, and widely used for economic analyses. 
Although the FSSC covers corporations, the paid-up capital of which is greater than or equal to 
10 million yen, we assume the results of the survey as a proxy for the entire corporate sector. 
The discontinuity in the survey because of the annual renewal of sampled firms has been raised 
as an issue and attempts have been made to overcome the problem (cf., Ogawa et al., 1994; 
Ogawa, 2000 and 2002; and Miyagawa et al., 2006). However, this paper does not make any 
adjustment because we use ratio variables, the numerator and denominator of which are 
constructed from the FSSC results surveyed in the same period, and thus the discontinuity 
seems to be less problematic. 
The ordinary profit rate is adopted to represent the profitability of the corporations. It 
                                                
7 Meanwhile, the uncollateralized rate can be obtained only from June 1985 (at the establishment of the 
market). 
8 To be exact, a larger number of the previous studies use monthly data. However, this paper uses 
quarterly data because we intend to use the results of the FSSC, which is published quarterly. 
9 A possible alternative for modeling is to add a variable for the money supply or the outstanding amount 
of bank loans. However, we omit it for the model because we use a more direct measure of the monetary 
policy (call rate) and of the liquidity of the corporate sector (quick assets ratio). 
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is defined as [ordinary profit/sales] ×100 (percent), with a high ratio corresponding to high 
profitability of the sector. The indicator combining profit and sales is also selected as a variable 
that compresses financial information on the profit-and-loss statement of the business. The 
quick assets ratio represents financial soundness and solvency in the immediate or short term. A 
high ratio indicates that there is adequate capacity to pay, which is associated with the 
soundness of the sector. It is defined as [quick assets/liquid liabilities] ×100 (percent): the quick 
assets = cash and deposits + bills and accounts receivable + short-term securities; and the liquid 
liabilities = bills and accounts payable + short-term borrowings + allowance + other liquid 
liabilities.10 The indicator compresses financial information on the balance sheet of the business 
for both assets and liabilities. We seasonally adjusted the two variables using the Census X12 
procedure. Figure 3 shows the results of the two variables; the ordinary profit rate and the quick 
assets ratio. 
 
***** Figure 3 ***** 
 
3. Estimation and Impulse Responses 
Using these economic variables and the bankruptcy rate, we estimate a vector autoregression. 
The lag order q is set to four because we are undertaking quarterly analysis. Real GDP and the 
GDP deflator are converted to natural logarithms and multiplied by 100. All variables are used 
in level, not in difference. To identify the fundamental shocks, as above, we apply the Cholesky 
decomposition approach. The Cholesky ordering of variables is set as follows: call rate (r), price 
(p), output (y), profit rate, quick assets ratio, and bankruptcy rate. The ordering is based on the 
recursive orthogonalization by Sims (1992) and Miyao (2000 and 2002). 
                                                
10 All of the terms in the quick assets ratio are constructed by the average of the amount at the end of the 
period and the one at the end of the previous period, both of which are obtained from the FSSC results 
surveyed at the same time. 
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Figure 4 illustrates the estimated impulse responses. It displays the results of the 
variables, except for responses of the call rate, up to 20 quarters after a one standard deviation 
shock in each of the six variables. Dotted lines show the one standard error bands (cf. Shioji, 
2000; and Miyao, 2000 and 2002), which are calculated by 2,500 Monte Carlo replications. We 
omit the impulse responses of the call rate to simplify the figure.11 
 
***** Figure 4 ***** 
 
In general, the figure shows expected and consistent relationships between economic 
shocks and each variable. In particular, a positive shock in the call rate depresses total output, 
ordinary profit rate and quick assets ratio, and most importantly, raises the bankruptcy rate, that 
is, the aggregate probability of bankruptcy (column 1 of Figure 4). The results indicate that a 
monetary tightening shock exerts clear negative effects on these variables. Second, positive 
shocks in total output (column 3), ordinary profit rate (column 4) and quick assets ratio (column 
5) show clear positive effects. These shocks stimulate the economic environment, the 
profitability and liquidity of the corporate sector, and depress the bankruptcy rate. In terms of 
the responses of the bankruptcy rate, these results indicate that a monetary tightening shock 
raises the bankruptcy rate, and that shocks in total output, profit rate and quick assets ratio 
depress it (row 5 of Figure 4).  
However, in the figure, we find the appearance of the price puzzle; that is, the price 
level rises after a monetary tightening shock (row 1 of column 1). This is a relatively common 
result using the standard vector autoregression (Christiano et al., 1999). The price puzzle is not 
solved in our model even by including additional variables such as an index of commodity 
prices, oil price, exchange rate, or corporate goods prices, which are incorporated into the 
previous models to (possibly) reduce it when the price puzzle appears. Furthermore, the 
                                                
11 The first-period response of the call rate to the shock in the call rate is estimated to be 0.508.  
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responses to the shock in the price level are unclear (column 2). 
We also checked that the results of impulse responses remain almost unchanged if we 
limit our sample period up to the first quarter of 2001 (i.e., 105 quarters). It means we limit the 
data period to just before the implementation of the quantitative easing policy by the Bank of 
Japan; which temporarily changed the target of monetary policy from the policy interest rate to 
the amount outstanding in the current accounts of financial institutions at the Bank of Japan. 
As a supplementary analysis, we estimated a vector autoregression where the total 
amount of liabilities of bankrupt corporations replaces the bankruptcy rate, and constructed its 
impulse responses. The amount of liabilities is a possible alternative measure for evaluating the 
impacts of bankruptcies in relation to the economy. The results are summarized in the appendix, 
showing similar response structures to those in this and the next section. In that sense, the 
presented relationships between the economy and aggregate bankruptcies are relatively robust. 
 
4. Extension 
This section extends the analysis to the industry level, and we examine differences in the 
responses among industries. We focus on three sectors: manufacturing, construction, and 
wholesale and retail trade. On average in the sample period, the number of corporate 
bankruptcies in manufacturing account for 18% of total corporate bankruptcies, construction 
27%, and wholesale and retail trade 38%: the three sector combined account for 82% of the 
total.12  
For each sector, we construct the industry-level ordinary profit rate, quick assets ratio, 
and bankruptcy rate. They are calculated and seasonally adjusted in the same way as the 
aggregate variables described in Section 2. The ordinary profit rates and quick assets ratios are 
constructed from the results of the FSSC, and bankruptcy rates from the results of the 
Bankruptcy Reports and the National Tax Agency Statistics Reports. Figure 5 shows the 
                                                
12 The wholesale and retail trade sector includes eating and drinking places. 
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bankruptcy rates by industry. The movements are similar across industries, but the level of the 
construction sector tends to be higher than those of the others. 
 
***** Figure 5 ***** 
 
Using these industry-level variables and macroeconomic variables, the call rate, price 
level and aggregate output, we estimate three types of industry-level vector autoregressions 
comprised of six variables and with four lags, and construct impulse responses. Figure 6 
presents the estimated responses of the three industry-level variables for (a) manufacturing, (b) 
construction, and (c) wholesale and retail trade. Similar to Figure 4, the figure illustrates 
impulse responses following a one standard deviation shock in each of the six variables, the 
dotted lines show the one standard deviation error bands by Monte Carlo simulation, and the 
Cholesky ordering is the same as in the previous section. 
In principle, the industry-level responses are similar to those for the aggregate analysis 
in Figure 4. For instance, a monetary tightening shock depresses the ordinary profit rate and 
quick assets ratio, and raises the bankruptcy rate (columns 1 of Figure 6 (a), (b) and (c)). 
Positive shocks in total output, profit rate and quick assets ratio depress the bankruptcy rate 
(rows 3). The results indicate the potential similarity and robustness of the estimated structures 
of the economy, especially relating to the bankruptcy rate.  
Meanwhile, for details of the results, the responses of the two financial variables to the 
shock in the call rate for the manufacturing sector are clear, relative to those for other sectors 
(rows 1 and 2 of columns 1). The responses of the profit rate differ across industries to a degree 
(rows 1). The timing of the peak of the response of the bankruptcy rate to the shock in the quick 
assets ratio for the construction sector is later than those for other sectors (rows 3 of columns 5). 
In summary, while the basal similarities of sectors are illustrated, the details of the impacts show 
differences, which are informative. 
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***** Figure 6 ***** 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper highlighted the macro aspects of bankruptcies in Japan, and estimated vector 
autoregressions comprising five economic variables and the bankruptcy rate. The estimated 
impulse responses showed dynamic relationships between economic shocks and the bankruptcy 
rate. In particular, a positive shock in the call rate clearly raises the aggregate probability of 
bankruptcy, and shocks in total output, ordinary profit rate and quick assets ratio depress it. We 
also estimated industry-level models for manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and retail 
trade, which revealed fundamental similarities and showed differences in the details of the 
economic structure. Our results further imply that the change in the bankruptcy rate reflects the 
accumulated impact of various shocks in the present and past, to which aggregate bankruptcy 
has a distinct response structure. 
Although the model and results in the paper are relatively simple, we can utilize them 
as a key benchmark for future studies. The specification and variables for the vector 
autoregression can be further developed to examine economic behavior from a different angle. It 
would be useful to incorporate the possibility of structural changes into the analysis (cf. Qu and 
Perron, 2007). For instance, details of institutional and social systems have been transformed in 
the long run, and the Japanese economy experienced a prolonged stagnation after the bubble 
economy burst. Furthermore, our approach will make a contribution to the analysis of the 
Japanese business cycle. 
Finally, a fundamental question remains as to whether or how much we should 
recognize the (possible) positive effects of bankruptcies in promoting restructuring of the 
economy (Caballero et al., 2008). In our analysis, related results on this issue are shown in 
rightmost columns of Figures 4 and 6 in the form of impulse responses of the economic 
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variables to a shock in the bankruptcy rate. Most of the responses are negative or insignificant, 
and especially Figure 4 shows that a shock in the bankruptcy rate deepens the deflation and 
depresses total output even in the long run. Our results therefore present very limited evidence 
of the positive effect of bankruptcies. However, the question is still open and future research is 
required before a conclusion can be made. 
 
Appendix: Impulse responses in the total-liabilities model 
The main part of the paper focused on the behavior of the bankruptcy rate, according to the 
research stream denoted in Section 1. However, the bankruptcy rate is not the sole measure of 
bankruptcies. In addition, the total amount of liabilities when companies go bankrupt could be 
considered another important factor for evaluating the interactive and dynamic structures 
between aggregate bankruptcies and the economy. 
 In this appendix, we investigate a different specification of the model where the total 
liabilities of bankrupt corporations replace the bankruptcy rate. The total liabilities data are 
obtained from the Bankruptcy Reports. The methodology, the five variables other than total 
liabilities and the estimation periods are the same as in the main part of the paper. Total 
liabilities are seasonally adjusted, in natural logarithms and multiplied by 100. We first estimate 
the model for the total economy, as in Section 3, and subsequently the industry-level models for 
(a) manufacturing, (b) construction and (c) wholesale and retail trade as in Section 4. 
The estimated impulse responses are displayed as Figures A1 and A2. The figures show 
similar response structures to Figures 4 and 6, respectively. In general, a monetary tightening 
shock depresses total output, the profit rate and the quick assets ratio, and raises the total 
liabilities of bankrupt corporations (column 1). Positive shocks in total output, the profit rate 
and the quick assets ratio tend to depress total liabilities (row 5 of Figure A1 and rows 3 of 
Figure A2 (a), (b) and (c)). Furthermore, the rightmost columns of the figures show very limited 
evidence of the (possible) positive effects of bankruptcies. A shock in total liabilities depresses 
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the price level and the output of the economy (Figure A1). In principle, the results presented in 
the main part of the paper are also supported by the alternative specification. 
 
***** Figure A1 ***** 
***** Figure A2 ***** 
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Figure 1. Number of bankruptcies in Japan 
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Figure 3. Ordinary profit rate and quick assets ratio  
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Figure 4. Impulse responses 
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Figure 6. Impulse responses by industry  
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Figure A1. Impulse responses in total-liabilities model
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Figure A2. Impulse responses by industry in total-liabilities model 
Profit
Quick 
assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
Responses   
of:
Responses   
to: r p y Profit Quick assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
Profit
Quick 
assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
Responses   
of:
Responses   
to: r p y Profit Quick assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
Profit
Quick 
assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
Responses   
of:
Responses   
to: r p y Profit Quick assets
Bankruptcy 
(liabilities)
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-0.1
0.0
0.1
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
5 10 15 20
